We study experimentally how entry into a market with uncertain capacity is affected by the type of information potential entrants have available. Our focus is on behavior in a two-market entry game. In the risky information market there are two possible market capacities, both known to occur with probability 1/2. In the ambiguous information market the two possible market capacities effectively occur with probability 1/2 but participants are only told that there is uncertainty about capacities. We find that average entry is higher under ambiguous information than under risky information. To control for comparison effects and the effects of strategic interaction in the twomarket environment we also study a two-lottery individual decision problem and onemarket entry games with ambiguous and risky information. For these two cases the experimental results show no difference between information conditions. Our results are consistent with the notion that complex strategic interaction leads to higher market entry under ambiguous information.
Introduction
We study experimentally how entry into markets with uncertain capacity is affected by the type of information potential entrants have available. Our focus is on behavior in an entry game with two markets. In both markets capacity is uncertain and can take two possible levels. In one of the markets the information about the uncertain capacity is precise, in the sense that the probabilities of the two capacity levels are known. In the other market the information is ambiguous, the probabilities are not known.
Our general motivation is to contribute to the understanding of strategic behavior in an entrepreneurial context. What we do is related to three lines of research. Two of these lines are experimental and the third relates to broader issues. The first is the study of behavior under different kinds of uncertainty. Knight (1921) Later Ellsberg (1961) suggested -in a number of thought experiments -that the presence of imprecise or ambiguous information about probabilities can affect decision making in ways that lead to inconsistencies with standard models of behavior under uncertainty. Following the Ellsberg paradox numerous individual decision making experiments were carried out and new theoretical models of decision-making under uncertainty were developed.
The issue we focus on is a simpler one, namely how people's behavior varies in a strategic context between situations of risk and situations of ambiguity. There are some other experimental studies that study ambiguity in various strategic contexts, different from the one we analyze. Sarin and Weber (1993) study ambiguity in an experimental asset market using auctions and find that the market price for the unambiguous bet is considerably larger than the market price of the ambiguous bet. Camerer and Karjalainen (1994) study attitudes to ambiguity by looking at whether players prefer to bet on moves by the other player or moves by an objective randomizing device. The experimental results show a modest but persistent degree of ambiguity-aversion with subject heterogeneity. Chen et al. (2006) study ambiguity in the first and second sealed bid auctions and find that in first price auctions, bids are lower with the presence of ambiguity, which can be explained as ambiguity loving. that in an experimental auction game for which both players should theoretically prefer that private valuations do not be common knowledge, players do earn higher profits without the information, but many of them choose to have the information anyway. This preference is attributed to ambiguity aversion.
Kocher and Trautmann (2010) study selection either into an auction with risky prospects or into one with ambiguous prospects and find lower entry into the ambiguous one, but equal transaction prices for ambiguous and risky auctions. Using a measure of risk attitude, they find that bidders in the market for the ambiguous prospect are less risk averse than those in the market for the risky prospect, and the thinner markets for the ambiguous prospect can help explain equal transaction prices for both prospects. Ivanov (2010) studies peoples behavior in one-shot normal-form games and finds that 32/46/22 percent of subjects are classified as ambiguity loving/ambiguity neutral/ambiguity averse. Their findings suggest that there is no strong systematic tendency towards ambiguity loving and ambiguity seeking, with slightly more proportion on ambiguity loving. They also observe strong subject heterogeneity. 1 The second line of research our work is related to is the experimental analysis of market entry games. A market entry game with the basic features of business entry situations was first studied in the experiments by Daniel Kahneman (1988) , and was then explored more thoroughly by Amnon Rapoport and his colleagues ; Rapoport et al. 2002a ; Rapoport et al. 2002b ), as well as by Duffy and Hopkins (2005) . Rapoport et al. (2000) is the first study that analyzes entry in a two-market entry game.
Pogrebna and Schade (2009) go one step further and study a two-market entry game in which markets are heterogeneous with respect to capacity, entry costs and potential payoffs.
One common characteristic of all the market entry experiments above is that the entry decision is made under a given market capacity. In our design market capacity is uncertain, a feature that we consider to be characteristic of many, particularly new markets. We believe that our combination of two markets with the presence of exogenous uncertainty yields a useful simplified representation on entrepreneurial entry environments.
The third related research line relates to broader business and economic issues. "Excess entry" into markets and high rates of business failure are important economic phenomena. Dunne et al. (1988) estimate that 61.5 percent of all entrants exited within five years and 79.6 percent exited within ten years in the four-digit U.S. manufacturing industries. Most of these exits were failures. (see also Shapiro and Khemani, 1987; Dunne et al., 1989a, b; Geroski, 1991; Baldwin, 1995; Wu and Knott, 2006) . Some possible explanations of overentry have been developed. A long history of entrepreneurship literature has asserted that it is entrepreneurs' risk bearing characteristics 1 For a synthetic overview of uncertainty issues see Wakker (2008) . and ambition that lead to excess entry. More recently, in two different experimental studies, Camerer and Lovallo (1999) find that overentry results from entrepreneurs' overconfidence when making decisions, while Grieco et al. (2007) suggest that it is related to their self-assessed competence and emphasize the effects of feelings of competence in economic activity. All these studies focus on the importance of entrepreneurial personality in understanding overentry. Entrepreneurial personality is one way to understand overentry into markets. However, more common human tendencies may also be a factor. It is also possible that the presence of imprecise information about relevant market parameters may play a role in inducing over-entry in a context like the entry game we study here.
We present data from three different treatments. Our focus is on behavior in a twomarket entry game. In this game, each player has three options. One is not entering any of the markets and obtaining a payoff with certainty. The other two choices are entering into one of two markets with uncertain capacities in which payoffs will depend both on the capacity realization and on the number of entrants. In the risky information market there are two possible market capacities, both known to occur with probability 1/2. In the ambiguous information market the two possible market capacities effectively also occur with probability 1/2 but participants are only told that there is uncertainty about capacities.
The data exhibit over-entry in both the risky and the ambiguous market. We also find that average entry is higher under ambiguous information than under risky information.
What drives the ambiguity-seeking behavior we find? One possibility is that it is the fact that risk and ambiguity are jointly present in the two-market entry game. Indeed, both Fox and Tversky (1995) and Chow and Sarin (2010) find that the price difference between known and unknown bets is larger in comparative evaluation than in separate evaluation, where in separate evaluation the difference disappears in the former but slight difference still exists in the latter research. Although in those studies the comparative environment leads to ambiguity aversion, while in our two-market game we observe that subjects are comparatively attracted by ambiguity, it may still be a relevant factor in our case. Another possibility is that it is the joint presence of exogenous and strategic uncertainty that causes the behavior we observe.
We use two treatments to test separately for these two factors. In one treatment, we remove the strategic interaction but still let players face a risky and an ambiguous situation simultaneously. Specifically, subjects can choose to participate in a lottery with risky information and another one with ambiguous information. We refer to this treatment as the individual choice situation. In the other treatment, we remove the comparative effects of risk and ambiguity but keep the strategic game setting. Here we compare the behavior of subjects that can choose to enter a market with stochastic market capacity and risky information and another one with the same distribution of stochastic capacity but ambiguous information about it. In other words, strategic interaction under risky and ambiguous information takes place separately (between subjects) and is compared later. We refer to this treatment as the one-market entry game. The results from the individual choice situation and from the one-market entry game show no difference in the choices towards risk and towards ambiguity. Taken together these results are not compatible either with a comparative ignorance explanation or with one based on the joint presence of exogenous and strategic uncertainty. 2 Note that if we had only run one of the two treatments, we could have incorrectly concluded that one of the two explanations discussed above was the correct one. See Abbink and Brandts (2008) for another market experiment in which two treatments yield results that are contradictory with each other and Abbink Our results can be summarized as follows. In relation to the excess-entry literature discussed above we can say that the combination of the presence of two markets and of uncertainty does induce excess-entry and more so if the information about market capacities is ambiguous. The higher entry under ambiguous information can not be explained either by the joint presence of exogenous and strategic uncertainty or by a comparative ignorance type argument. Perhaps it is the higher complexity of the situation that triggers less thoughtful and more impulsive decisions leading to over-entry exacerbated under ambiguous information. 3 In the final section of the paper we come back to this. Given that natural environments are invariably complex our two-market entry game may be a useful instrument for analyzing entry issues.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces our treatments and the theoretical benchmarks of the market entry game and characterizes its equilibria. Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 contains the conclusions.
Experimental Treatments and Theoretical Benchmarks
In this section we first present the three treatments in detail, then move to our parameter choices and the theoretical benchmarks and end with description of our experimental procedures and participants.
Treatments
and Brandts (2010) for a discussion of what one can learn from complex market environments like ours. 3 In a very different line of research, psychologists have used the concept of ambiguity tolerance (Furnham and Ribchester 1995) to refer to the way an individual perceives and processes information about ambiguous situations when confronted by an array of unfamiliar and complex clues. Complexity in strategic environments may arouse the tolerance for ambiguity in some people.
Our design is composed of three treatments. Treatment 1 is a two-market entry game with uncertain capacities in both markets. Treatment 2 is an individual choice situation, where individuals face two lotteries without any strategic interaction. Treatment 3 is a onemarket game with uncertain capacity. Treatment 1 -involving two markets -is our central treatment. Being the most complex treatment, one can consider it to be the one closest to the natural environments we are interested in. Treatments 2 and 3 control for the two sources of complexity present in the two-market game.
Treatment 1: A two-market entry game.
This entry game is played by a group of 7 players facing two independent markets. Each player  has to choose -simultaneously with and independently from the other playerswhether to stay out (  = ) for a fixed payoff 12 or enter one of the markets (
Payoffs are linear in the number of entrants and are computed from the following formula, which is common knowledge:
where   ( =  ) is the market capacity in market  and   and   are the numbers of actual entrants, (including subject ), into the two markets, with 0 ≤   +   ≤ 7.
In both markets capacity was uncertain and could independently take a low value  or a high value  . Participants knew that, if they entered either of the markets, they would face an uncertain capacity. The way of operationalizing the uncertainty about market capacities is one of the important design choices.
For both markets the probability for the two capacity levels was  = , drawn indepen-dently for each period. However, the information about  was different for the two markets, being precise in one market and ambiguous in the other market. In the market with precise information, market  , subjects were explicitly told that capacity   was from one of the two values  and  each occurring with probability 1 2 . We will refer to this situation of an uncertain capacity with known probability as one involving risk.
In the market with ambiguous information about market capacities, market , subjects only knew that capacity   was from one of the two values  and  and that the probability of the two capacity levels was constant across all periods. We will refer to this situation of an uncertain capacity with unknown probability as one involving ambiguity.
The probability we used for the market with ambiguous information -the true probability
, just as in the market with precise information. In making this choice we were guided by the simple idea that if a prior is not known, it is reasonable to assume that subjects will start with a uniform prior. 4 This idea, often called the principle of indifference or the principle of insufficient reason, has a long tradition, going back to Jacob Bernoulli and Laplace. We feel that  = 1 2 is a good starting point for the kind of comparison we are interested in. In our context, it has to be related to the fact that subjects make decisions repeatedly; more on this below.
In both markets the low and high capacity levels were 11 and 31, respectively. 5 The realizations of  and  for the two markets over the 50 periods were generated by the computer.
Two observations are important here. First, we used two realizations in the different sessions of treatment 1, as well as in treatments 2 and 3. In half of the sessions of treatment 1, we 4 Drouvelis et al. (2009) also use this assumption. 5 By choosing these non-integer values we avoid multiple equilibria in the game; more on this below.
used realization 1 for market  and realization 2 for market . In the other half of the sessions, we switched the two realizations for the two markets, so that now realization 2 was used for market  and realization 1 for market . This controls for sampling error and, hence, facilitates the comparison between behavior in the two markets.
Second, we generated realizations of the sequence of capacities before the experiments took place and chose two realizations in which two values appears quite evenly around 25 periods out of 50 periods. We wanted to avoid results distorted by extreme sequences of values of  and . Below we will explain how the two realizations were used in treatments 2 and 3.
Treatment 2: An individual choice situation.
In this treatment players choose between a safe choice and two lotteries, which are constructed using the payoff functions of treatment 1, discussed above. Similarly to treatment 1,   and   are random variables that take values 1.1 and 3.1 with probability  = The payoff function for this treatment was the following:
Without interaction there are no equilibria to consider. The issue here will be a simple 6 The value 2.1 is quite close to the pure strategy equilibrium number of entrants in the strategic game in Treatment 1. comparison between the frequency of choice Y and that of Z.
Treatment 3: A one-market entry game
This treatment consists of two subtreatments: a one-market entry game with uncertain capacity and precise information about capacities and an analogous game with ambiguous information about capacities. A one-market entry game is played by a group of 5 players who must decide simultaneously and independently whether to enter a market (  =  ) or to stay out (  = ). The payoff to player i's is computed from the following formula, which is common knowledge:
Where choice  denotes a market with risky or ambiguous capacities. 0 ≤  ≤ 5 is the number of subjects (including subject ) choosing  .  is the actual market capacity occurring in a certain period.
Theoretical Benchmarks and Parameter Choices
For the two treatments with interaction, the equilibria of the one-shot game yield theoretical benchmarks to which the data can be compared. In what follows we describe the equilibria based on the assumption that players evaluate ambiguous information about uncertainty in the same way as precise information. For the two-market game of treatment 1 there are
the largest integer smaller than the expected value of capacities in market ,   .
Additionally, there is a symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium with entry probability of firm
. Note that the expected number of entrants in the symmetric mixed equilibrium is  *    , which is different from but can be very close to the pure strategy equilibria value  *  .
Given that there were 7 players and the capacities in both markets where  = 11 and
, the pure strategy Nash equilibria have 2 players entering each of the two markets (and 3 staying out), while the symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium predicts an individual entry probability 0183 and the expected number of entrants in each of the markets being 1281.
As shown above, for the one-market games of treatment 3 we chose different parameters.
There were now five players and  = 21 and  = 41 with  = 1 2
. Pure strategy Nash equilibria have 3 players entering and 2 players staying out. Symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibria predict an entry probability 0525 and the expected number of entrants 2625.
What is the rationale behind the parameter choices for the two entry games? First, we choose  and  to be non-integers so that there exists only one pure equilibrium number of entrants 7 . At the same time, the values are close to an integer so that in equilibrium the payoff difference to those entering one market and those staying out remains quite small.
Second, the outside option, the capacity and the number of players in a group all differed between the two and the one-market treatments, with values of 12, 1131 and 7 in treatment 1 and of 6, 2141 and 5 in treatment 3. We chose these values to keep the equilibrium choices more comparable. For the pure strategy equilibria, the two-market entry game in treatment 1 has 3 players always choosing Out and 4 players always choosing Entry (2 in each market), so that the ratio of Out to Entry choices is 34. While the one market entry game has 2 players always choosing Out and 3 players always choosing Entry. The ratio of Out to Entry 7 If   and   are integers, there exists two pure equilibria entrant numbers.
is her 23, which we judged to be close to 34.
For the mixed strategy equilibria of the two-market game of treatment 1 the expected number of entrants is 2562 = 1281 + 1281, while the expected number of entrants in the one-market game is 2625, a number rather close to 2562.
In most of the literature on repeated play of market entry games in fixed matching, individuals' coordination on the behavior of others lead to an asymmetric pure equilibrium even though such play may take a long time to emerge. In the present experiments, under coexistence of uncertain capacity and multimarket settings, coordination among players becomes very hard. Given the assumption of identical incentives among players, one might think that the mixed symmetric equilibrium is particularly salient.
In treatment 2, the lottery treatment, payoffs of each individual are independent of other players. In the payoff formula we set a fixed value 21 in the place of the number of entrants   . This number is close to the pure strategy equilibrium entrant number 2 in treatment 1.
Procedures
The experimental procedures for all three treatments follow the same steps. At the beginning of a session subjects received the instructions on paper. The instructions were worded in neutral terms, without any reference to markets. After the instructions had been read aloud by one of the experimenters, subjects completed a set of review questions on the computer terminals to test their understanding of the instructions. They could not finish this part until they had answered all the questions correctly. In the instructions subjects were told that they would have to make one choice between two options (treatment 3) or between three options (treatments 1 and 3) in each of the periods of the session, and that they would play the same game repeatedly in 50 consecutive periods. In treatments 1 and 3 -involving strategic interaction -subject were told that they would play the 50 periods with the same group with fixed partners. 8 In order to ensure that subjects clearly understood the payoffs resulting from choosing to enter a market, the instructions also included payoff tables showing all possible payoff values from choosing entry. Such payoff tables were shown to subjects in each period. In each period all subjects made decisions simultaneously without communication among them. For the case of ambiguous information fixed matching raises the possibility that subjects choose the option with ambiguous information to learn more about the true underlying distribution of capacities. In the results section we take this possibility into account.
We use fixed matching based on the following considerations. First, it makes it easier to obtain many statistically independent observations. Second, it facilitates comparability with previous studies of market entry games most in which also use fixed matching.
At the end of one period, the only information they received is their own payoffs and their payoff history. This kind of information feedback tries to simulate the situation in the field, where entrepreneurs face both competitors and variable market conditions. They are only able to know the final result of their decisions, such as their payoffs, but not how their payoffs result from the interaction of the two factors.
In addition, this information feedback makes it hard for subjects to learn the probabilities about capacities and others' strategies for the case of ambiguous information. 9 
Participants
184 students from the Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona of Spain participated in our experiments. They were recruited through E-mail invitations on an experimental recruiting website using the ORSEE system 10 . Each subject was only allowed to participate in a single session that lasted around 45 minutes. 84 students participated in Treatment 1 in 12 groups of seven, and we ran four sessions 11 with 21 subjects seated in each session. 25 students participated in Treatment 2, and we ran two sessions 12 with 12 subjects and 13 subjects in each session. 75 students participated in treatment 3 in 8 groups of five and 7 groups of five separately, and we ran two separate sessions for the one-market game with risk and with the one-market game with ambiguity. 13 
Experimental Results
Our experimental results are separated in two parts. We first present the results pertaining to the two-market entry games. In the second part, we report the experimental results of the one-market entry game and the individual choice game. We will relate the data in the two parts to explain why and how people deal with uncertain information of risk and ambiguity in strategic games.
it more natural to avoid belief elicitation at this point. 10 Greiner, B., (2004) . An Online Recruitment System ORSEE. 11 As mentioned above, for the realizations of capacities  and , in two sessions we use realization 1 for the risky market and realization 2 for the ambiguous market; in the other two sessions, we switch the two realizations between the two markets. 12 Here in one session we use realization 1 for the risky market and realization 2 for the ambiguous market; in the other session, we switch the two realizations between the two markets. 13 Here in the one-market game with risky information, we use realization 1 in one session and realization 2 in the other session. We do the same in the one-market game with ambiguous information.
Results of the two-market entry game
In this section, we analyze entry behavior moving from the aggregate level to the group level and finally to the individual level. We first look at the aggregate number of entrants of all subjects in risky and ambiguous markets over 50 periods, then do the same by group and, finally, we examine individual decision processes. We summarize our findings in three results. We first state each result and then present the evidence that supports it. Our first result pertains to the direct comparison of entry into the two markets.
Result 1: The number of entrants into the ambiguous market is higher than that into the risky market. This difference diminishes over time but does not disappear.
We get into the heart of the matter by comparing the numbers of entrants over time in the risky information and ambiguous information markets. The two panels of Figure 1 show the number of entrants into the two markets, averaged over all groups, by period and averaged over every 5 periods respectively. In the upper panel, one can see that in the first four periods there is a large difference in the number of entrants in the ambiguous market (with the highest value around 3) and the risky market (with the lowest value around 1).
From then on the number of entrants in both markets fluctuates between 15 and 25. The impression is that the number in the ambiguous market is higher than the number in the risky market in most periods, but the difference is not very clear in the final periods.
The lower panel of Figure 1 shows the average number of entrants averaged over every 5 periods. One can see that the number of entrants in the risky market is always slightly below the pure strategy equilibrium value 2 and is always above the mixed strategy equilibrium value 1281. Comparatively, the number in the ambiguous market is always above 2 except for the value pertaining to periods 36-40. Figure 1 suggests that there is a preference for entering into the ambiguous market rather than into the risky market. The difference in mean entrants in the two markets becomes smaller and both values get closer to the pure strategy equilibrium value 2 in the final periods. We use t-tests to compare average entry into the two markets of all subjects for the 50 periods, the first 25 periods and the last 25 periods, respectively. The corresponding p-values are 0.0001, 0.0001 and 0.077 with average entry always higher for the ambiguous market. Table 1 gives a complementary view of the data shown in Figure 1 . It shows the distribution of the number of entrants ( = 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7) into each of the two markets in the first 25, the last 25 and all 50 periods, respectively. The numbers listed in the table denote the number of times the two markets had the eight possible numbers of entrants.
Observe two important features of the data shown in the table. First,  = 2 is the mode both for ambiguity and for risk. Second, for each of the numbers of entrants  ≤ 2 (i.e., including no entry), the numbers of entrants into the risky markets are higher than those of entrants into the ambiguous markets. Comparatively, for 7    2, the numbers of entrants into the ambiguous markets are higher than those of the entrants of risky markets.
The numbers shown in Table 1 confirm the impression that, on average, there is more entry into the ambiguous information market. We now move to looking at more disaggregated data. Table 2 reports the mean number of entry into the two markets for each of the twelve groups; standard deviations appear in parentheses, both for the first and the last 25 of the total 50 periods. In periods 1-25, the mean for ambiguity is higher than (equal to) that for risk for 10(2) groups. In periods 26-50, the same holds except for group 1, group 2 and group 9. The last row reports the p-values from a binomial test of the difference in the entrants, based on a null hypothesis that the number of entrants is the same for ambiguity and risk (as is true in equilibrium). The results of the text show that we can easily reject the null hypothesis of equal entry into the two markets in the first 25 periods but can not in the last 25 periods.
Next we compare observed behavior to the theoretical benchmark behavior presented in section 2.
Result 2: Both symmetric mixed strategy and pure strategy equilibrium strategies fail to explain individual behavior, both under risky and ambiguous information markets. Subjects mix their entry decisions but in a way very heterogeneous.
Recall that in the pure strategy equilibrium the number of entrants into each of the markets is 2, while in the mixed strategy equilibrium it is 1.281. point is based on 25 observations for each individual. For example, the points on the diagonal line OB describe individuals whose entry frequencies in the two markets are the same, while points on the diagonal line AC describe individuals whose sum of entry frequencies in the two markets equals 1, in other words, those who never choose Out. In another example, the points on the line OA represent individuals who never enter the risky information market. In both panels, one can see the benchmark point indicating the mixed-strategy equilibrium 14 .
One can see that in both panels the points representing individual entry frequencies are scattered without any clear concentration in any particular area. Individuals clearly mix between entry into one and the other market, but in ways which are hard to account for by the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. It seems that the points are more loosely 14 The mixed strategy equilibrium value in the risky information market is 0.183. Such a prediction is based on the assumption of risk neutrality. Symetrically, we posit the equilbrium value in the ambiguous information market to also be 0.183 under the assumption of a neutral attitude towards risk and the application of the principle of insufficient reasoning, i. e. probability 1 2  for the case of unknown probability. distributed in the right graph compared with the left one and such changes may be helpful in explaining the diminishing difference in entry into the two markets. In particular, many points move to the edge of the graph (X axis, Y axis and the diagonal line AC).
Summarizing, subjects mix their choices but in a heterogeneous way. The observed mixed entry behavior is far from the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium prediction. Mixed strategies in repeated games was studied in market entry games by Rapoport, Seale and
Winter (2000) and Zwick and Rapoport (2002) . The common characteristic in these studies is that there are significant departures from mixed strategy equilibrium play at the individual level, where there are many subjects who either enter too frequently or too infrequently, and most importantly there may exist sequential dependencies that constitute adaptation and repetition bias. This raises the question whether, in our experiment, do individuals' decisions follow a certain form of adaptation, such as coordination, and does individual entry behavior converge to the pure strategy equilibrium prediction? Figure 3 shows the number of entrants into the two markets in each group over 50 periods. We can see clearly that the numbers fluctuate even in the final periods and that no coordination at the pure strategy equilibrium is achieved.
The results we have reported until now show that entry into the ambiguous market is larger than into the risky market and that observed behavior is far from both the pure and the mixed equilibrium outcomes. Our third result pertains to a more detailed analysis of individual behavior over time. The motivation for looking at this feature of our data is twofold. First, given that we chose an environment with repeated play it's important to look deeper into whether behavior changes over time. Second, the analysis of behavior over time may yield some insights into the reasoning process behind observed behavior. Result 3: There is more persistence in the ambiguous market than in the risky market: for any payoff-level staying in the ambiguous market is more frequent than staying in the risky market.
A simple way of studying strategies in repeated situations is to observe how subjects switch between choices. Here we are interested in studying the choices in period  based on the case of having entered into the risky market and the ambiguous market in period  − 1.
Subjects may react quite differently to payoff information from a previous risky choice or a previous ambiguous choice.
We will look at this issue by relating choices in period  to choices and the consequences of choices in period  − 1 based on the aggregate observations across all subjects over 50 periods. 7 2 ) ( 1 9 5 ) ( 2 6 4 ) ( 2 5 8 ) ( 1 8 6 ) ( 9 9 ) ( 1 0 7 9 We look at the data in two different ways. First, we compare the proportions of staying in Risk in the first block with the proportions of staying in Ambiguity in the second block in response to the same payoffs. It describes how people stick to the same choice. In the upper 15 Payoff 02 is one of the possible results but does not appear in the observations. block, we observe that the proportions of staying in Risk are quite similar for various payoffs in Risk in period  − 1, while in the middle block, the proportions of staying in Ambiguity increase as the payoffs in Ambiguity in period  − 1 increase. In comparison the proportions of people sticking to Risk are always equal or lower than those of sticking to Ambiguity in response to the same payoff level, and the difference becomes larger for high payoff levels.
How can these differences be explained? Taking the payoff information of 14.2 and 16.2 as an example, this payoff information implies that the capacity is high and there are 2 and 1 entrants in the market, respectively, in the period. However, it seems that people react to it differently depending on whether such information stems from a risky or an ambiguous market. For a payoff of 16.2 the frequency of sticking to the risky market is 0.434 and 0.714 in the ambiguous market, for a payoff of 14.2 the frequency of sticking to the risky market is 0.538 and 0.649 in the ambiguous market and the same direction of the inequality holds for all other payoff levels except 4.2, where the two relevant frequencies are equal. People tend to stick more to their previous choice if they had chosen to enter an ambiguous market. 16 The second way of looking at the data of table 3 is to study switches in decisions. On the one hand, we make a comparison of switches from one market to the other market. The proportions of switches from an ambiguous market to a risky market in response to most payoff levels are slightly lower than from a risky to an ambiguous market. On the other hand, we study how they make decisions between the other two choices once they deviate from the one choice. The expression in the last row,
 +
, in the upper block and 16 One point worth mentioning here is that although subjects are only told their own payoffs, they can figure out the state of capacity and the number of people in the market once their payoffs are 0.2 (implying low market capacity with all 7 people in the market), 2.2 (implying low market capacity with 6 people in the market), 14.2 (implying high market capacity with 2 people in the market) and 16.2(implying high market capacity with only 1 people in the market). However, we do observe the same trend on all payoff levels. increases as the amount of payoffs increases, while the value  + reacts little to different payoffs. It seems that when people switch out of a risky market, they prefer ambiguous market to staying out, while when they switch out of an ambiguous market, they may be not very interested in entering in risk. To conclude our description of the data of Table 3 , individuals prefer to stay in Ambiguity and are more likely to switch from Risk to Ambiguity than from Ambiguity to Risk. 17 We can also look at switches in decisions at the group level, aggregated over 50 periods. Table 4 reports the observed proportions of choices Out, Risk and Ambiguity in each group in period  in response to choices Out, Risk and Ambiguity in period  − 1 respectively. The proportions of sticking to the same choice are, except for group 4 and group 5, higher for Ambiguity are higher than for Risk. The proportions of switching to Ambiguity are higher than those of switching to Risk in all the 12 groups. All the observations in Table 3 and 4 suggest that there exists more persistence in the Ambiguous information market. This higher persistence in the market with ambiguous information is not easy to interpret.
Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004) study the hierarchy in thinking steps in such strategic games. They find that high level thinking may happen in members of the fixed group in simple strategic games. If this were the case in our experiment, then subjects would choose the market which they think is less desirable for other decision makers. According to such an explanation, people would enter an ambiguous information market, because they think others' are ambiguity-averse. However, our two-market entry game is neither a simple strategic game nor a one-shot decision problem. Based on the observation in Table 3 , entry frequencies stay higher for ambiguous market than for the risky market in the first part of the games, which is hard to explain with level-K thinking model.
It is compatible with the notion that, under risk, participants have more self-control over their behavior and stick more to a pattern of switching between markets intended to make their behavior unpredictable. In contrast, the higher persistence under ambiguity can be interpreted as the result of a more unreflective tendency to simply stick to a decision which has yielded a positive payoff. Note that the differences in the frequencies of staying in the same market tends to be higher for the higher payoff levels 14.2 and 16.2 than for the lower ones 4.2 and 6.2. This suggests that, without precise information about the exogenous probability, subjects lose some control over their decisions and this effect is stronger when they receive high payoffs.
Results of the individual choice game and the one-market entry game
The previous section raises two questions about how to explain the results. Does ambiguity seeking result from players interacting in strategic environments? Does it result from the information type itself or from the comparative effects between information types? In this section we provide answers to these questions. As before, we first state a result and then discuss the support we have for it, Result 4: There is no difference in the number of entrants between the risky information lottery and the ambiguous information lottery in Treatment 2.
The two graphs in Figure 4 report the aggregate proportions of entry into each of the We can also look at individual data to compare entry frequencies in both markets. Table   5 (analogous to Table 4 Table 5 and Figure 4 show no clear tendency of entering more into either market. Num. Risk  Ambiguity 3 7
Num. Risk  Ambiguity 10 8
Result 4 clarifies two facts. First, it is not simply that repeated play of the game leads to more choices of ambiguity in an attempt of sampling the distribution and finding out the true probability. We observe a slight overentry into the ambiguous information market only in the first 5 periods, but this is not long enough to figure out the probability information of the ambiguous information market. Second, without strategic interaction, individuals are indifferent between the two markets, so that the result for the two-market case is not simply due to a comparison effect of the type reported in Fox and Tversky (1995) . We now move to our final result.
Result 5: There is no difference in the number of entrants when players face risky or ambiguous information in a one-market entry game in Treatment 3.
The two panels of Figure 5 show number of entrants into the two markets, averaged over all groups, by period and averaged over every 5 periods respectively. Recall that here the data from two separate market games were collected between subjects. As in Figure 4 , we find that the two lines indicating risky information and ambiguous information overlap over all 50 periods. At the beginning, the mean numbers of entrants in both types of information are higher than both the mixed strategy equilibrium number 2625 and the pure strategy equilibrium number 3, and they are around the pure strategy equilibrium level 3 in the middle periods of the game, but increase again somewhat in the final periods to the original level. Hence we can conclude that the result in our two-market game is not due to the existence of strategic interaction. 
Summary and Conclusions
Our experiments find ambiguity seeking in a strategic two-market entry game, but no ambiguity effects in either an individual choice problem or a one-market entry game. The ambiguity-seeking behavior we find is striking since most previous studies on ambiguity find that people prefer to avoid situations with ambiguous information. A tight explanation of our results is hard to formulate.
However, we conjecture that in strategic games ambiguity effects may depend on the strategic complexity of the games. The aversion to ambiguity has been widely documented mostly in individual decision-making environments. With respect to our results, we speculate that strategic complexity together with ambiguous information may make people feel competent or overconfident vis-à-vis the competition. In a complex environment the competition may trigger over-entry and this tendency is strengthened when the probabilities about the state of the market are unknown. The idea of overconfidence and competence in economic decisions goes back at least as far as Adam Smith (1776) in the The Wealth of Nations.
There Smith argues that people systematically overestimate their chances of success in any venture.
Our results are in consonance with some previous studies on entry. Camerer and Lovallo (1999) is the only study of market entry games to explain over-entry in the field. We believe that decision making in strategic environment with ambiguous information is a very common situation in the field, but is poorly understood. Hsu et al. (2005) study the neural basis of decisions under risk and ambiguity and find that there is a general neural circuit responding to different degrees of uncertainty, contrary to decision theory. They find that the level of ambiguity in choices correlates positively with activation in the areas relating the integration of emotional and cognitive input (orbitofrontal cortex, OFC) and with reactions to emotional information (amygdala). It is possible that the interaction of ambiguity and strategic complexity leads to a more emotional response . There appears to be a long way to go in understanding behavior under ambiguity and more field experimental and brain studies will be needed to better understand this issue.
APPENDIX A: Instruction of the two-market entry game
General Information
The purpose of this experiment is to study how people make decisions in a particular situation. From now on and till the end of the experiment any communication with other participants is not permitted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and one of us will come to your desk to answer it.
You will receive 4 euros for showing up on time for the experiment. In addition, you will make money during the experiment. Upon completion of the experiment the amount that you make will be paid to you in cash. Payments are confidential; no other participant will be told the amount you make.
Rounds and Groups:
This experiment will have 50 rounds. In each round you will be in a group with 6 other participants, totally 7 people. The members in your group will be fixed in all rounds. You will not be informed of the identity of people who you are playing with neither during the experiment nor in the end of the experiment.
Description of the Decision Task(s) in the Experiment:
In each round, you are asked to make a choice between one of three possible actions, action "", action " ." or action "". If you choose action , you will receive a fixed amount of money. If you choose  , your payoff will depend on the state of the world and the choice of other participants in your group. Given certain state of the world, the less the number of  chosen by your group, the higher your payoffs is in choosing action  . If you choose , your payoff will depend on the state of the world and the choice of other participants in your group. Given certain state of the world, the less the number of  chosen by your group, the higher your payoffs is in choosing action .
The state of the world in action  will be high or low. When you make your decision you do not know it is high or low. However, all of you know the probabilities of high or low.
The state of the world in action  will be high or low. When you make your decision you do not know it is high or low, and you also do NOT know the probabilities of high or low. However, you know that the probabilities of high and low are uniform in every round.
How payoffs are determined
Payoffs in every round of this game are determined as follows.
• If you choose action , your payoff for the round is 12.
• If you choose action  , your payoff for the round depends on the state of the world and the total number of players, including yourself, who choose action  .
Suppose that n =1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 represent the number of players in your group who choose action  . If you are one of these  players, your payoff for the round is given by:
Your points in one round = 12 + 2( − )
The value of c depends on the state of the world for choice Y. In every round it will be  = 11 with probability 1 2 or  = 31 with probability The value of c depends on the state of the world for choice Y. In every round it will be  = 11 or  = 31 with unknown probability, but the probability keeps uniform in every round. First, you need to make your choice on action , action  or action . The computer will display a screen like the one shown below. Please press the button besides your choice.
You may change your choices as often as you like, but once you click on "Enter" your choice is final. Meanwhile, the computer will "roll the die" to decide the state of the world of action  ,  = 11 or  = 31, and the state of the world of action ,  = 11 or  = 31.
Then, the computer helps calculate the result, and you will be informed of your payoff in this round, your accumulated payoff in the past rounds, and the decision you have made.
Payoffs
At the end of the experiment you will be paid, in cash, the sum of the payoffs that you will have earned in the 50 rounds of the experiment plus show up fee 4 euros. The ratio between the experimental points and euros is 1 point = 002 euros. As noted previously, you will be paid privately and we will not disclose any information about your actions or your payoff to the other participants in the experiment.
Payoff quiz
Before we begin the experiment, please answer the following questions. The following questions aim at helping you understand how the payoffs are realized. We will go through the answers to a sample problem before you do the rest of the quiz. Please raise your hand if you are having trouble answering one of the questions.
Sample Question: If you made a choice of action , and the state of the world  = 11 and the number of  in your group is 1 and the number of  in your group is 3, as a result, your payoff is ___6___. We use multinomial probit model 18 to estimate different coefficients for three possible outcomes for each individual: staying out, entering risky information market and entering ambiguous information market. The independent variables are one's payoff in period  − 1, the dummy variables indicating one's choice in risky and ambiguous markets in period  − 1, and the dummy variable of gender. Table B1 contains the multinomial probit results, where the two outcomes in the table are: entering risky information market and entering ambiguity 18 The multinomial probit is becoming a good alternative to the multinomial logit model for the advantage of relaxing the independence of irrelevant alternativs (IIA) assumption. market. The omitted outcome is staying out. Each column represents a different multinomial probit model. Column 1 contains the most controls, whereas column 4 contains the fewest controls.
Regardless of the model specification, the dummy variables indicating one's choice in period  − 1 are positive and significant, where the value of the dummy variable risk is higher than that of ambiguity in the outcome of entering risky information market, and the value of the dummy variable ambiguity is higher than that of risk in the outcome of entering ambiguous information market (e.g. the coefficient 1.843 in ambiguity and 1.284 in risk of model (1)). It implies that both a choice of ambiguity and a choice of risk in period  − 1 will increase one's preference to entering in ambiguity or risk compared with the outside choice of a fixed payoff. We observe persistence in both markets and stronger effects in ambiguous market. In contrast, profit(t-1) is less significant or not significant at all when I move the controls Dummy (risk=1 at  − 1) and Dummy (ambiguity=1 at  − 1) away in model (4) . 
